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There is a long-standing debate in the comparative welfare state literature as to 
whether social policy regimes come to look more alike over time (Kerr 1962; 
Wilensky 1975; Brooks & Manza 2006) or else retain their distinctiveness, either 
because of the path dependent nature of institutional change (Esping-Andersen 1990; 
Pierson 2001) or because of the financial and electoral costs of restructuring (Taylor-
Gooby 2001; Van Hooren 2014).   Also of longstanding is the question of whether 
‘regime-types’ or ‘families of nations’ tend to cluster together, even in periods of 
considerable change (Esping-Andersen 1990; Castles 1993).  In more recent times, 
there has been added the question of whether partisan identity has ceased to matter 
in the social policy arena as all governments are driven to adopt similar policy 
reforms under largely external imperatives over which they have little or no control, 
a process which may or may not be subsumed under the general logic of 
‘globalization’ or the more particular circumstances of ‘permanent austerity’ 
following the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 (Pierson 1994; Pierson 2001; Kwon 
and Pontusson 2010; Finseraas and Vernby 2011).    
 
 
 
2 
 
In this paper, we test out each of these questions by exploring the trajectory of 
income maintenance policy in the United Kingdom (UK), Australia and New 
Zealand over a twenty-year period (from 1996).1  We are especially interested to see 
if the ‘dynamics of convergence’ have actually changed and whether an accelerating 
process of ‘globalization’ and/or the consequences of GFC have really made a 
difference.   To do this, we deploy Colin Hay’s (2004) six-stage framework for 
analysing convergence in a detailed examination of changes and continuities in three 
key policy areas: ‘welfare-to-work’, child-contingent support and pensions.   Overall, 
we find that the social/economic pressures faced by all three countries are more 
similar now than they were two decades ago and that each has sought to legitimize 
its policy response to the GFC in similar ways.  In terms of the three areas we have 
explored in some detail, we find that convergence is much more substantial in 
‘welfare-to-work’ than in either child-contingent support or pensions.  But we also 
find that any straightforward convergence story is unsustainable, despite the GFC 
and accelerating ‘globalization’, and partisan effects remain important. 
 
Convergence and Partisanship 
 
In their sixteen-state comparative survey, Achterberg and Yerkes (2009) report three 
common explanations for welfare-state convergence: the dynamics of European 
                                                 
1 On the comparative experience of these three states in an earlier period, see Castles 
and Pierson, 1996; Pierson and Castles, 2002) 
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economic integration (Cornelisse and Goudswaard, 2002; Caminada, Goudswaard 
and van Vliet, 2010); domestic drivers such as demographic, economic and cultural 
pressures, including increasing unemployment and social inequality, which make 
universalist welfare states unaffordable (Pierson, 2001; Taylor-Gooby, 2001); and the 
financial imperatives of globalization and the inter-related project of political and 
economic liberalization, which force all welfare states to engage – more or less 
comprehensively – in a ’race to the bottom’ in social provision standards, largely 
irrespective of partisan incumbency (see Castles, 2004; Korpi, 2003; Starke at al., 
2008; Jensen, 2011). The former is not relevant to this article, since neither Australia 
nor New Zealand are part of the European Union, but arguably all three countries 
have been challenged by the latter two. In regard to globalization, Hay (2004) reports 
two key arguments: first, that capital mobility and competition under open economy 
conditions generate common inputs or pressures, so that states and/or political-
economic regimes have no independent mediating role, minimizing partisan 
differences and leading to common outputs. A second thesis argues that 
globalization produces a variety of common pressures to which competing models 
of capitalism are differentially exposed, promoting a dual process of convergence 
accentuating historically-embedded differences between liberal market economies 
and coordinated market economies due to their institutional differences.  Given our 
focus on three countries which have traditionally adopted ‘liberal’ market 
economies, we concentrate on the former hypothesis. 
In practice, few empirical studies have found definitive evidence of general 
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welfare state convergence (Bouget 2003; Starke et al. 2008; Jensen 2011).  Indeed, 
empirical findings are often contradictory; for instance, while Cornelisse and 
Goudswaard (2002) found some degree of convergence among European Union 
member states, other studies of Europe have found the opposite (Ferrera et al. 2001; 
Castles 2004).  Shared patterns of incremental change are possible and, in some 
cases, this may be significant in the long term (Korpi 2003; Korpi & Palme, 1998) but, 
as Hay (2004) has argued, common trends across countries do not necessarily imply 
cross-national patterns of convergence.  As Achterberg and Yerkes (2009: 192) note, 
‘researchers often look only at general measures for divergence while 
simultaneously sweeping aside differences between countries, and the direction in 
which countries are moving is not shown’.   
Evidence on welfare state convergence after the GFC is also ambivalent.  A 
number of scholars have investigated the impact of the post-2008 recession on 
welfare states (including Armingeon 2013; Hermann 2014; Obinger and Starke 2014).  
But there is limited agreement on its real impact.  For some, it is an impetus to 
further and more general retrenchment; for others, it heralds a period of greater 
differentiation as some especially vulnerable states (Greece is a favourite exemplar) 
are left behind, with a peculiarly acute crisis of public indebtedness driving them to 
abandon much of their existing public welfare apparatus (van Kersbergen et al. 2014; 
Petmesidou and Guillén 2014).   More generally, there is surprisingly little evidence 
that international economic crisis has led to sudden and fundamental welfare state 
reform (Armingeon 2013; Blyth 2013; Van Hooren et al., 2014). 
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The claim that partisan differences are now of limited importance for policy 
outcomes is well-established in the literature (Pierson 2001; Streeck 2014; Chwalisz 
and Diamond 2015).  It tends to focus on the idea that, through a mixture of internal 
and external dynamics (globalization, ‘permanent austerity’, ‘partisan dealignment’, 
societal ageing), governments have been left with very limited scope to do things 
differently in the welfare state arena – especially in regard to income maintenance. 
Our extended analysis of three states, all of which have seen multiple changes of 
governing party, provides an empirically-informed challenge to this view. 
 
 
Cases and Methods 
 
Our three cases were selected because they have been widely classified as similar, 
‘liberal’ welfare states with comparatively market-oriented and ungenerous social 
policy regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990). They share a single language, a common 
history, a common legal system and broadly similar political systems and public 
policy heritage (both practically and intellectually).  We might thus expect them to 
belong to a ‘convergence club’, where countries cluster together because of shared 
features or institutional/ historical background (Knill 2005; Schmitt and Starke 2011). 
Generating a more nuanced – and empirically sustainable – account of 
convergence/divergence in the three countries is complicated by the concept itself 
being so ‘notoriously slippery’ (Hay 2004, 244).  Here we are influenced by the work 
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of Knill (2005), who distinguishes between four different types of convergence: 
sigma, beta, gamma and delta.  We focus primarily upon sigma-convergence (a decrease 
in variation of policies amongst countries studied) and beta-convergence (where 
laggard countries catch up with leader countries over time due to their policies 
changing faster than the latter).  We also heed Van Hooren et al’s (2014) call to 
distinguish between the direction of change (retrenchment or expansion) and the 
quality of change (such as how basic principles of benefit eligibility and entitlement 
rules are affected).  A further useful distinction (Hay 2004) is that between causal 
factors which bring about convergence (independent responses to a parallel problem, 
pressure from international organisations or international law, regulatory 
competition emerging from increasing economic integration, transnational 
communication and so on) and facilitating factors which affect triggering mechanisms 
(e.g. institutional similarity of countries studied, type of policy, particular policy 
dimensions studied).   
More specifically, we draw upon Hay’s (2004) six-fold typology: 
1. Convergence in the pressures and challenges to which political-economic regimes 
are exposed: input convergence 
2. Convergence in the policy paradigms and cognitive filters in and through which 
such pressures and challenges are identified and understood: paradigm convergence 
3. Convergence in the policies pursued in response to such pressures and challenges: 
policy convergence 
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4. Convergence in the ideas used to legitimate such policy choices: convergence in 
legitimatory rhetoric 
5. Convergence in policy outcomes, usually gauged in terms of indicators of policy 
performance: output convergence 
6. Convergence in the process in and through which challenges are translated into 
policy outcomes: process convergence 
Following Hay (2004), we first evaluate whether our three cases faced similar 
pressures and challenges since the mid-1990s and how these shaped political 
rhetoric. We then analyse whether convergence (and/or partisanship) was manifest 
across our chosen period by focusing on three key areas of income maintenance: 1) 
welfare-to-work initiatives which target the working-age population, where we 
might be most likely to see convergence given the intense pressure to reform in 
almost all developed countries over the past twenty years; 2) child-contingent 
support targeting children, both because this is a policy area where what were once 
non-work-related benefits have been drawn closer to work conditionality and 
because evidence suggests that this is an area where governments of varying 
political persuasions have chosen to focus increased spending effort; and 3) state 
pension provision focused on the elderly population, one of the largest areas of 
social expenditure and one where established programmes are regarded as 
especially path-dependent and, consequently, resistant to (converging) reform.   
Drawing on policy documents, secondary literature and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) data (limited in many cases by the age or 
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extent of data available across all three countries), our qualitative analysis identifies 
sigma-convergence as having occurred when the cases have moved closer together in 
at least two of the three different stages of convergence we examine for each policy 
area.  
For brevity’s sake, we do not address Hay’s (2004) concept of process 
convergence here.  Our analysis does however show that policy convergence does 
not necessarily mean that countries are following a common trajectory, while policy 
divergence does not mean that states may not be following the same broader 
trajectory.    Shared direction of travel and convergence are not the same thing.  
Looking not only at different stages in the policy process but also at multiple policy 
areas and over time, what emerges is a complicated picture. 
 
Shared pressures, challenges and rhetoric 
 
Figure 1 shows that all three countries have faced similar social and economic 
pressures since the mid-1990s: the working age proportion of the population stayed 
fairly static (around 65-66% in each country), while that aged over 65 grew by almost 
1% in the UK and around 2.5% in Australia and New Zealand. In 2013, the elderly as 
a percentage of the working-age population was 29% in the UK compared to 23% in 
the two other countries (OECD 2013), suggesting that this challenge was greatest in 
the UK.  Figure 1 nonetheless indicates that differences between the countries 
generally decreased between the mid-1990s and mid-2010s. 
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Similarly, all three countries faced growing income inequality in the late 
1990s, with some relief in the 2000s. Again, this challenge was greater for the UK 
overall, while New Zealand appeared to have better and Australia lesser success in 
reducing inequality across our time period. However, differences in levels of 
inequality in each country again reduced over the period. As numerous OECD (2009; 
2014a; 2014b; 2015) reports attest, all three countries were under pressure to address 
such issues and later discussion highlights how they adopted a fairly uniform set of 
rhetorical tools to legitimate policy action aiming to improve the ‘sustainability’ of 
welfare systems (English 2015; Hockey 2015; Osborne 2015). 
Figure 2 helps to explain why the post-GFC recession was severe in the UK, 
milder in New Zealand and (at least technically) non-existent in Australia (UNICEF 
2014; Van Hooren et al. 2014). GDP growth declined in all three countries around 
2009 but only the UK reported negative growth and it rated more poorly than the 
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other two countries in both the mid-1990s and the mid-2010s. The UK’s current 
account balance also dropped most significantly overall (meaning a higher level of 
debt), although New Zealand’s experience was particularly volatile in the mid-2000s. 
In contrast, Australia moved from having the greatest to the least debt across the 
period. On both indicators, however, the economic positions of the three countries 
were more similar (poor growth, significant debt) than in the mid-1990s. There was 
also greater convergence in unemployment rates but, having declined in all three 
countries through the late 1990s, unemployment was lower in New Zealand (just 
under 4%) than either of the other countries (around 5%) in the 2000s. Rates 
increased following the financial crisis, peaking at just over 8% in the UK in 2011, 
while New Zealand’s remained under 7% and Australia peaked at just over 6%. 
Australia’s levels of unemployment grew more slowly following the GFC but 
continued to climb until 2014.  
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Although the extent to which the three countries faced these economic 
pressures was more similar than two decades earlier, they were clearly not in the 
same economic position when the GFC hit.  Given this, the political rhetoric used to 
frame the financial crisis and its repercussions did not vary as much as one might 
expect. Alluding to the period of enforced austerity between 1940 and 1955 to invoke 
nostalgic sentiment about being ‘in this together’, the British Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government elected in 2010 adopted a strong ‘austerity’ 
discourse to justify radical reforms, including reducing government spending by an 
average of 20% over four years, eliminating 490,000 government jobs, cutting 
benefits, abolishing ‘unnecessary’ programmes and freezing public employee 
salaries. There was also an emphasis on the ‘Big Society’ and social action at the local 
level, which framed civil society and the voluntary sector as supporting the kind of 
values that would counter ‘welfare dependency’ and justified devolution, for 
example in healthcare (Clarke and Newman 2012; Levitas 2012).  
In New Zealand, the GFC was also interpreted through the language of both 
economic austerity and reducing welfare dependency, but the National 
government’s communicative discourse did not need to be as multi-layered or as 
powerful as that of the British Conservative-Liberal Democrat government: although 
National ran zero budgets two years running, made significant public sector job cuts 
and renewed efforts to (partially) privatise state assets, these moves allowed new 
operating initiatives totaling $5.8 billion between 2008-2009 and 2012-2013. Tax cuts 
were central to this but there was also additional spending on health, education and 
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even relatively generous redundancy and wage supplement packages to individuals 
affected by the recession and the Canterbury earthquakes in 2010-11. Indeed, these 
and other national disasters were used to provoke a sense of national solidarity that 
justified reduced spending in some areas (Humpage, 2015). 
Van Hooren et al. (2014, 612) note that although Australia did not technically 
enter a recession, this was not clear at the onset of the financial crisis and the Labour 
government elected in 2007 emphasised the need for a quick, decisive response. 
There was some reference to austerity, but Australia’s stimulus spending was well 
above the OECD average (New Zealand sat around the average and the UK was 
below it) and focused on key areas such as education and health infrastructure, as 
well as pension rates (UNICEF 2014). Labour’s political rhetoric around poverty and 
the unemployed was also less moralising than in the other two countries, with a new 
Minister for Social Inclusion and a Social Inclusion Unit reflecting a commitment to 
assist the most disadvantaged geographic areas and communities to re-enter 
mainstream economic and social life (Wilson et al. 2013). Once the Liberal-National 
government returned to power in 2013 (and Australia’s economic performance 
weakened), however, a rhetorical focus on welfare dependency and austerity framed 
recessionary-like policies such as public servant salary freezes and a three-year 
Temporary Budget Repair Levy on incomes over $180,000 (Hockey 2014; Meagher 
and Wilkins 2014). In this sense, there were not only strong similarities in the social 
and economic pressures faced by the three countries, but also in how these were 
discursively inflected by elite actors by the mid-2010s. 
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Significant convergence: ‘Welfare-to-work’ 
 
Facing relative stability in the working-age population at a time when the proportion 
of elderly citizens was growing and with unemployment (particularly amongst the 
young) remaining a significant problem, all three countries adopted a similar policy 
solution: reorienting the welfare system to ensure that every working-aged person 
was in paid work, whatever their circumstances.   While Conservative governments 
placed more emphasis on ‘welfare dependency’ and the 'cultural' component of 
long-term poverty and Labour governments emphasised ‘social exclusion’ and 
‘social investment’ (Humpage 2015; Marston and McDonald 2007), overall there was 
remarkable similarity in government rhetoric stressing that ‘[t]he best route out of 
poverty is work’ (Osborne 2015, n.p). 
A focus on employment has always been a feature of liberal welfare states, 
particularly in the wage earners’ welfare states of New Zealand and Australia where 
universalism was less prevalent but similar or better levels of societal well-being 
than the UK were achieved through a high minimum wage and highly-regulated 
labour markets (Castles and Mitchell 1992). But there has been a dramatic 
reorientation away from citizen rights to employment and social security towards 
citizen responsibilities to find work since the 1980s (Humpage 2015). Table 1 indicates 
significant convergence around the types of policies embodying this change. In 
particular, while in the mid-1990s the special circumstances of sole parents and those 
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who are sick or disabled were widely recognised, by the mid-2010s these groups 
were routinely subjected to the same kind of work-related obligations and sanctions 
as other unemployed people.  
 
 
 
New Zealand’s National government (1990-1999) made a decisive move, tightening 
eligibility and introducing increasingly harsh work obligations for the unemployed 
across the 1990s, extending these to sole parents and trialling work capacity 
assessment for the sick and disabled by the end of the decade.  Despite some 
softening of this approach after 1999, the Labour-coalition gradually extended some 
form of work-focused assistance to all categories of working-age benefit claimants 
and promoted a ‘work-first approach’ (St John & Rankin 2009).  The National 
government returned to office in 2008 further increased part-time work obligations 
for sole parents with young children and for sickness benefit recipients (English 
2015; Humpage 2015). 
Australia’s conservative Liberal-National coalition government (1996-2007) 
also extended work obligations through the 1990s and, following a review of welfare 
in 2000, introduced new sanctions for ‘breaching’ work commitments. It also 
Table 1:  Change in welfare-to-work policies, mid-1990s to mid-2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2000s
Mid-
2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2000s
Mid-
2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2000s
Mid-
2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2000s
Mid-
2010s
Australia            
NZ            
UK            
Policy 
Work obligations/sanctions 
for sole parents/sick
‘Simplified’, work-focused 
benefit system
Work for dole
Significantly different 
entitlement/obligations for 
young unemployed
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extended workfare requirements to a wider group of welfare claimants, moving sole 
parents and people with disabilities onto a less generous unemployment benefit 
(Wilson et al. 2012). New applicants who were single parents (with a youngest child 
aged over eight years) or who had a disability and were deemed able to work 
became subject to part-time work requirements (Wright et al. 2011). The Australian 
Labor government (2007-2013) maintained the direction of travel, increasing work-
related participation requirements, tightening eligibility for the Disability Support 
Pension and transferring all remaining recipients of the Parenting Payment to the 
lower NewStart allowance (Marston and McDonald 2007; Australian Council of 
Social Services - ACOSS 2014). The returning Liberal–National government’s 
Reference Group for Welfare Reform (2015) also called for a simpler welfare 
structure with fewer primary payments and fewer supplements. 
In Britain, ‘New’ Labour returned to power in 1997 with a 'welfare-to-work' 
pledge whose principal vehicle was to be the 'New Deal'.  This multi-faceted, work-
activation programme initially focused on the young unemployed, then successively 
widened to take in other 'disadvantaged' groups: the long-term unemployed, lone 
parents, those with a disability, partners of the unemployed and those over fifty 
(Millar 2008). Across time, more groups were drawn into mandatory participation in 
work-readiness programmes (Lupton et al. 2013).  The Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat coalition government (from 2010) and then the Conservative 
administration (elected in 2015) continued this trend towards a more work-focused 
welfare system with 'fewer benefits, fewer layers of bureaucracy and with financial 
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support firmly focused on making work pay' (Department for Work and Pensions 
2010, 1).  
In all three countries, economic conditions following the GFC were used to 
justify a ‘simplification’ of the benefit system and, increasingly, (a reduced number 
of) benefit categories became focused on work capacity rather than the cause of 
unemployment (Humpage 2015).  The GFC also triggered an increasingly harsh 
approach towards the young unemployed in particular.  Australia’s reforms were 
arguably the most severe: from 2015 the Liberal-National government required new 
Newstart or Youth Allowance (Other) applicants under age 30 to participate in job 
search/employment services activities for up to six months before receiving the 
payment, then subjected them to at least 25 hours per week of work-for-the-dole 
activities for six months before returning them to a waiting list (Hockey 2014). In 
2013, New Zealand introduced ‘income management’, which quarantines parts of 
benefit payments for essential expenses such as utilities and food, for younger 
claimants. In Australia, income quarantining, which was originally introduced in 
2007 as part of an emergency intervention into Aboriginal communities in the 
Northern Territory, was later extended to benefit recipients of all ages by Labor 
(Saunders and Deeming 2011; Wilson et al. 2013).  In 2015, under-25s in the UK were 
excluded from the Conservative government’s National Living Wage and those aged 
18-21 lost automatic entitlement to housing benefit in 2015 (Osborne 2015). By the 
same year, all three countries also required young people to be in work, training or 
education to receive a benefit. Table 1 indicates that the only significant policy 
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difference remaining in this area in the mid-2010s was that both the UK and 
Australia required some benefit recipients to work in return for their benefit while 
New Zealand abolished this policy in 2001. 
Given the reforms described above, we might expect benefit generosity to 
have declined across all three countries. Table 2 shows average net replacement rates 
for those unemployed over a five-year period following initial unemployment. 
OECD data (available only between 2001 and 2013) show that generosity decreased 
in both Australia and New Zealand, even when cash housing and other social 
assistance are taken into account, although this was less evident for lone parents in 
Australia than New Zealand. In the UK, by contrast, the overall average for both 
those who are and those who are not eligible for ‘top ups’ actually increased, 
particularly under the Labour government (Lupton et al. 2013).  British generosity, 
including that for lone parents, was comparatively low when extra social assistance 
was not available but the overall average was still more generous than the other two 
countries in 2013 when cash housing and other assistance is included, quite a 
turnaround from twelve years previously.  
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This position has likely diminished given recent Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat and Conservative governments significantly reduced benefits across 
several years. Increases in working-age benefits were reduced first to the rate of 
inflation, then to 1% and subsequently to zero. From April 2013, a total benefits cap 
(£26,000 per year for workless families reduced further to £20,000 in 2015) explicitly 
demonstrated the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government’s desire to both 
reduce costs and create incentives for paid work (Osborne 2015).   The Conservative 
administration elected in May 2015 announced a £12 billion package of cuts, many of 
which were focused upon the working poor (though its tax credit reforms were 
delayed by the House of Lords (BBC News 2015). 
In contrast, the Australian Labor government (2007-2013) responded to the 
Single 
person, no 
children
Lone 
parent, two 
children
Overall 
Average
Single 
person, no 
children
Lone 
parent, two 
children 
Overall 
Average
2001 34 55 54 42 58 59
2013 27 54 47 33 56 52
2001 36 63 57 50 72 67
2013 30 52 47 40 59 55
2001 17 9 25 13 40 29
2013 17 31 32 45 69 61
Table 2: Net replacement rates over 60 months of unemployment,
 2001 and 2013, percentage1
No  cash housing assistance or social 
assistance "top ups"2
Qualify for cash housing assistance 
and social assistance "top ups"3
1.  Unweighted averages, for full-time earnings levels of 67% and 100% of average wage 2. 
After tax and including unemployment benefits and family benefits 3. After tax and including 
unemployment and family benefits.  Social assistance and other means-tested benefits are 
assumed to be available subject to relevant income conditions.  Housing costs are assumed 
equal to 20% of average wage. S ource: OECD, 2015
Australia
New Zealand
United Kingdom
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GFC with a significant one-off payment to benefit recipients and pensioners as part 
of a major fiscal stimulus package but it chose not to improve the generosity of 
regular unemployment benefits, which are low by international standards (UNICEF 
2014; Saunders and Deeming 2011).   Subsequently, the Liberal-National government 
froze working-age benefit levels for three years (Hockey 2014).  Meanwhile, New 
Zealand’s National government introduced a range of significant welfare reforms 
that targeted ‘welfare dependency’ from 2010 but, by contrast, announced the first 
real increase to the value of benefits for those with children in 43 years as a way of 
deflecting mounting political pressure to address child poverty (English 2015).  
Despite this divergence regarding benefit generosity, Figure 3 finds the level 
of spending on cash benefits for the unemployed and active labour market 
programmes in each country was more similar in 2012 than in 1995. Spending in 
both categories generally fell (from a low to a still lower level).  In part this reflected 
a decline in levels of unemployment but, even following the upkick in 
unemployment benefit spending following the GFC, resources devoted to this area 
were substantially lower at the end of our period.  
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Overall, there was significant convergence in the general direction of welfare-
to-work policies, the rhetoric used to frame it and spending patterns, but with 
differences evident regarding generosity. What impact did this have on outcomes for 
working-age people? Comparable data is limited but Figure 4 shows that the three 
countries clearly converged in regard to the level of poverty amongst this group 
prior to the GFC, but since then New Zealand’s working age population has fared 
worst (although with some improvement after 2011) and Australia’s the best. To 
date, however, the working age population was better off in the early 2010s 
compared to a decade earlier in the UK and New Zealand, while in Australia levels 
of poverty had returned to a level similar to the early 2000s.  
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Yet these data hide the relative position of those affected by a strengthening 
focus on welfare-to-work since the mid-1990s. For instance, in the mid-2000s, 
poverty amongst workless households was well above the OECD average in Australia 
and to a lesser degree in New Zealand, while the UK was well below the average. 
New Zealand was the outlier with far higher rates of in-work poverty than the other 
two countries (OECD 2009). In general, the limited data available suggests that gaps 
between working-age and other benefit entitlements grew over the period studied in 
all three countries (OECD 2014a; Perry 2014) suggesting that, despite the UK’s 
divergence regarding generosity, convergence in the rhetorical and policy focus on 
work as the primary form of welfare had a similarly detrimental impact upon the 
unemployed everywhere. 
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Limited convergence: Child-contingent support 
 
Growing inequality in all three countries affected not only those of working age but 
also children. In recent years, tax credits have become the main means for 
supporting families with children in all three countries.  This has been framed by a 
rhetorical commitment to 'making work pay' that both acknowledges the need to 
ensure leaving welfare is worthwhile and that child poverty is linked to parental 
economic circumstances.  
This commitment was stronger in the UK and New Zealand than Australia, 
particularly but not exclusively under Labour governments. The incoming British 
Labour administration in 1997 aimed 'to end child poverty forever' (Blair 1999, 1) 
and established regular reporting mechanisms to measure success against the 
marginally more modest intention to halve child poverty by 2010.  The New Zealand 
Labour-coalition government also wished from the early 2000s to reduce child 
poverty, though without setting any specific targets, and both it and the National 
government regularly increased the existing minimum wage and extended tax 
credits for working families (Humpage 2015).   In Australia, the Liberal-National 
government elected in 1996 also used tax credits to benefit working families but this 
was more focused on currying favour with the ‘aspirational’ middle class, reducing 
their anti-poverty impact (Wilson et al. 2012). Reducing child poverty only really 
became a part of the communicative discourse of Australian governments when 
Labor was re-elected in 2007.   
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Although the minimum wage remained significant, especially in Australia 
(Whiteford 2013), by the mid-2010s tax credits were the dominant means for 
assisting families with children in all three countries, with Table 3 showing that by 
the end of our period no country still offered a universal cash benefit for children.  
The UK had done so in the mid-1990s, abandoning this universalism only in 2010 
under a Conservative-Liberal Democrat government. Labour had also considerably 
extended the tax credit system, conflating work incentives and child outcomes until 
2003 when a loosely-targeted child-related weekly payment (Child Tax Credit) was 
separated from a Working Tax Credit for low-waged workers with or without 
children (Millar 2008). Labour’s  significant redirection of resources towards 
(especially low-waged) families with children will be affected by subsequent  
governments’ reduced spending on tax credits, which from 2015 will no longer be 
available for more than two children, as will a general reduction in all benefits levels 
(CPAG 2014; Osborne 2015).  
 
 
In New Zealand, the Labour-coalition government’s Working for Families 
package also targeted low- and middle-income families with dependent children 
Table 3:  Changes in child-contingent support, mid-1990s to mid-2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2000s
Mid-
2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2000s
Mid-
2010s
Mid-
1990s
Mid-
2010s
Mid-
2010s
Australia         
NZ         
UK         
Universal child cash benefit
Child/family tax credits 
targeted towards low-income 
Policy Paid parental leave
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from 2005. While benefit recipients benefitted from changed abatement rates and 
thresholds for the Accommodation Supplement and increased childcare subsidies, 
the package contrasts with the UK’s because it continued the previous National 
government’s favouring of children from working households by excluding benefit 
recipients from a new In-Work Tax Credit and increases to Family Support. Having 
criticised Working for Families when in opposition, the newly-elected National 
government retained the package but used the need for recessionary cost-cutting to 
reduce the income threshold for payments and to increase abatement levels 
(Humpage 2015).  
Over the long-term, lower levels of indexation (at or below the inflation rate) 
have a substantial impact upon the real value of benefits and O’Brien and St John 
(2014) predict that expenditure on Working for Families will continue to decrease 
through low or no indexation.  However, National did make some innovations in the 
interests of low-waged earners with children. It introduced a new Independent 
Earner Tax Credit of $15 per week targeting full-time workers receiving below-
average wages, including both low earners without dependent children and those 
who do not qualify for Family Tax Credits (National Party 2015). It also extended the 
20 hours ‘free’ early childhood assistance (legislated by Labour) to include under-
fives and a wider range of providers and,  increasing benefit levels for parents from 
2016 (English 2015). 
In contrast to the central (although not exclusive) focus on working, low-
income families evident in the UK and New Zealand, the Australian Liberal-National 
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government elected in 1996 expanded child-related support to include middle-
income earners, selectively abandoning means-testing and promoting ‘pro-family’ 
policies that favoured stay-at-home mothers; for example, the Child Care Tax Rebate. 
As elsewhere, income redistribution is determined not just by benefits but also by 
the rates and incidence of taxation and the Liberal-National government changed the 
balance between direct and indirect taxation, reducing the overall progressivity of 
the Australian taxation system (Whiteford 2013). Returning to office in 2007, Labor 
reduced some benefits for middle-income families and focused its stimulus packages 
on families, including a ‘tax bonus for working families’ of up to $900, a ‘single-
income family bonus’ of $900 and a ‘back to school bonus’ of $950 per child to 
families with school-age children receiving Family Tax Benefits A (Saunders and 
Deeming 2011). The new Liberal-National government’s budget in 2014-15 increased 
all payments (benefits and pensions) but in line with prices, rather than incomes 
(Hockey 2014). As Whiteford (2013) observes, the cumulative effect of such a basis 
for increases when wage growth is strong is actually to widen the gap between those 
with and without jobs. 
Australia was also an outlier for most of our period in terms of paid parental 
leave; the UK slowly improved provision first maternity and then paternity leave 
provision and New Zealand introduced then extended paid parental leave through 
the 2000s but the Australian Liberal-National government introduced a Baby Bonus 
in 2003 to avoid paid parental leave. Table 3 indicates that the policies of the three 
countries were more similar in the mid-2010s than two decades earlier, despite 
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continuing differences, after 18 weeks leave finally became available in Australia 
from 2011 (Stewart 2013; Wilson et al. 2013; Humpage 2015). 
The complex nature of child-contingent support and a lack of comparable 
data across time make it difficult to compare generosity. Figure 5 does indicate that 
the UK was the laggard when it comes to spending on family cash benefits in the 
mid-1990s, while this was the case for New Zealand regarding benefits in kind and 
Australia’s childcare/pre-school spending. By 2012, the UK was ahead in all three 
areas after significant and consistent investment, even after the GFC. Australia’s cash 
benefit support declined overall, although it did increase marginally after 2007 and 
New Zealand was slightly above its 1995 figure after peaking in 2009. More 
generally, all three countries increased the level of benefits in kind and support for 
childcare/preschool but the gap between the three countries widened across the three 
types of expenditure.  
 
 
 
Much of this difference resulted from the British Labour government’s 
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significant investment in (poorer) children between 2000 and 2010. While many of 
the measures provided for new or enhanced services rather than the transfer of 
resources, Stewart (2013) estimates that spending on child-contingent benefits and 
tax credits more or less doubled across the period of Labour government.  This 
represented an overall increase in the proportion of GDP committed to child-related 
benefits and credits from 1.66% to 2.73% across the same period. Although the UK 
had the highest level of child poverty of all three cases in the mid-1990s, by around 
2010 it was significantly lower than in Australia or New Zealand (see Figure 6). 
 Labour fell far short of its stated ambition to halve child poverty, but CPAG 
(2014) reports that it lifted more than one million children out of poverty during its 
extended period in office. Such achievements in child well-being, however, are 
acutely vulnerable to reversal: the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government not 
only targeted the universal child benefit and reduced tax credits but froze child 
benefit rates then made them subject to the 1% up-rating rule from 2014/15, 
disproportionately impacting upon the low-income families with children. CPAG 
(2014) predicts another 600,000 children will live in poverty by 2015-16 as a result of 
reforms since 2010. Of these, around 70% will be in low-income working households. 
This trend has continued under the 2015 Conservative administration. 
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In New Zealand, Perry (2014, 26) believes the pro-work agenda of Working for 
Families ‘had little impact on poverty rates for children in beneficiary families (close 
to 75% in both 2004 and 2007), but halved child poverty rates for those in working 
families (22% in 2004 to 12% in 2007, and close to the same since then)’. Although 
returning close to pre-crisis levels in 2012-13, child poverty in New Zealand also rose 
in the aftermath of the GFC (Perry 2014), with UNICEF (2014) suggesting that 
National government’s ambitious tax cuts were not as effective as the kind of 
increased spending offered by Australia’s fiscal stimulus package. However, the 
failure to upgrade benefits in line with increases in wages in a period of sustained 
economic growth meant child poverty in Australia also rose through the 2000s, 
especially between 2003 and 2007 (ACOSS 2014). Overall, the fact that only the UK 
had lower child poverty in the mid-2010s compared to the mid-1990s suggests that, 
even if similar policies are implemented with similar rhetorical goals (as in New 
Zealand), differences in the level of spending led to divergent outcomes 
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Continued divergence: Pensions 
 
Population ageing means significant increases to the old-age dependency ratio, with 
the OECD average of working-age people per retiree expected to fall from four to 
between one and two by 2015, at a time when life expectancy is increasing. Political 
rhetoric promoting pension changes since the mid-1990s in all three countries has 
reflected the OECD’s (2014b) view that this makes present pension systems 
‘unsustainable’. The need to ‘manage risk’ by shifting it from the public to private 
purse was also framed as an opportunity for greater ‘freedom and choice’ over 
retirement savings (Cullen 2006; Harmer 2009; HM Treasury 2014). That all but one 
OECD (2014b) country reformed pensions in some way between 2012 and 2014 
suggests post-GFC austerity drives provided an opportunity to accelerate reform. 
Yet, wary of alienating an important electoral bloc during the economic downturn 
(Davidson 2014), governments of various political persuasions ensured elderly 
citizens fared best of the three age cohorts examined across our study period.  
How they did this remained relatively disparate, however. Table 4 indicates 
that in the mid-2010s, New Zealand was still the only country to offer a universal 
state pension, after it was reinstated by the National-New Zealand First coalition 
government (1996-1998) and restored to its former level of 65% of average wages by 
the Labour-coalition government (1999-2008). ‘Sustainability’ was to be achieved by 
investing government surpluses of $2 billion a year until 2020 into a newly-
established New Zealand Superannuation Fund in 2001. The National government 
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elected in 2008 suspended government payments to this fund until the country was 
back in surplus but made no other significant changes to New Zealand 
Superannuation (St John and Rankin 2009). 
 
 
 
However, New Zealand did move closer to the other two countries by 
incentivising (previously tax-neutral) private retirement savings through the 
introduction of KiwiSaver in 2007. This voluntary, work-focused, auto-enrolment 
private savings scheme offered a government-funded cash ‘kick-start’, fee subsidies 
and generous tax credits which facilitated high take-up. Initially members could 
contribute either 4% or 8% of their salary and employers were compelled to 
contribute 2% then 4% (St John & Rankin, 2009). The recession gave the newly-
elected National government a justification for reducing tax credits and halving 
member and employer contribution rates in 2009, then abandoning the cash kick-
start payment in 2015 (National Party 2015).   
Private employment-related contributions already played a significant role in 
funding retirement in the UK in the mid-1990s, when the Labour government 
initiated a complicated and extended reform process. State pensioners were first 
Table 4: Changes in state pension policies, mid-1990s to mid-2010s
Mid-1990s Mid-2000s Mid-2010s Mid-1990s Mid-2000s Mid-2010s Mid-1990s Mid-2010s Mid-2000s
Australia         
NZ         
UK         
Policy Universal state pension
Reforms to encourage  private 
retirement savings
Increased age of eligibility 
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taken out of the system of Income Support, with income maintenance provided on a 
means-tested basis through the 'Minimum Income Guarantee' and subsequently the 
'Pension Credit'. Labour also introduced a number of universal 'perks': Winter Fuel 
Payments, free TV licences, concessionary bus travel. The State Earning Related 
Pension Scheme (SERPS) was also replaced with the State Second Pension (S2P). 
Further substantial reforms followed in the Pension Acts of 2007 and 2008, including 
a return to earnings-indexation for increases in the basic pension and 'automatic 
enrolment' in a new defined-contribution, employer- and employee-funded National 
Employment Savings Trust (NEST 2014). Even in a recessionary context, the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat government did not include the state pension in its 
welfare spending cap, protecting the elderly from its changes to housing benefit, 
continuing to increase pensions in line with the higher of wages, prices or 2.5% and 
retaining 'perks' such as concessionary bus travel. It took steps to further simplify 
the basic state pension and eliminate what remained of the state second pension but 
continued to support NEST and began to liberalise the regime surrounding 
annuitisation of pension funds at retirement, giving pensioners greater discretion 
over the investment of their lump-sum retirement payments, while also promising to 
consult on tax relief to incentivise retirement savings (Department for Work and 
Pensions 2013; HM Treasury 2014; Osborne 2015).  
Considerable change was also apparent in Australia: the Liberal-National 
government increased employer contribution rates for the two-tier superannuation 
system, which combines a means-tested age pension with employer contributions to 
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individualised accounts in a private sector superannuation fund and, by 2007, 90% of 
wage earners received employer contributions. Increased generosity in tax 
concessions for mandatory private superannuation largely benefitted high income 
earners, particularly after 2006, with tax expenditures peaking at around $46 billion 
in 2007 (Collard 2013; Saunders and Deeming 2011; Wilson et al. 2013). In that year, 
the newly-elected Labor Government initiated a pension review (Harmer 2009) 
which reported that current pension rates did not fully recognise the costs faced by 
single pensioners living alone, paying ad hoc bonuses did not provide financial 
security, pension indexation should be more transparently linked to community 
living standards and price changes and system complexities inhibited the financial 
security of pensioners. The review also encouraged greater support of workforce 
participation over the pension age, greater targeting and an increase in the age of 
eligibility. Many of these measures were implemented in 2009, including an increase 
in the single pension rate from 61% to 67% of the married rate and a tightening of the 
means-test. Labor also introduced a resources super profits tax aimed at providing 
revenue for raising the Superannuation Guarantee Contribution to 12% between 
2013 and 2019 (Saunders and Deeming 2011; Wilson et al. 2013). Although it is not 
mandatory for employees to contribute, since 2003 lower-income workers have been 
able to access government co-contributions (matched savings) up to maximum 
entitlement (originally 150% of savings) and further improvements for low-income 
workers were announced in the 2011 Budget. Labor also improved the progressivity 
of tax breaks (Collard 2013).  
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Although the three countries were arguably moving in the same direction 
(incentivising private saving, reducing the burden on governments in the long-term), 
New Zealand was again the outlier regarding the increased age of eligibility for 
retirement pensions. When the Labour Party proposed gradually increasing 
retirement ages as part of its 2011 election campaign, Prime Minister John Key 
pledged retirement ages would not be increased while he remained head of 
government (Hartevalt and Vance 2011). Australia and the UK, however, moved to 
increase the pension age to 67 by 2022 and 2026 respectively following the GFC, with 
Australia planning a further move to 70 by 2035 (Hockey 2014; OECD 2014b). 
How did these differences impact upon pension generosity? Figure 7 
considers the position of a single person who enters the labour market at age 20 in 
2012 compared to 2006, finding that net replacement rates increased in all three 
countries. There was a significant increase in Australia, but little movement in the 
two other cases. 
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Given such generosity figures are predictions for new workers, they are not 
reflected in Figure 8, which shows that spending on old age pensions as cash 
benefits did not shift significantly between 1995 and 2012 in Australia. New Zealand 
saw a dramatic decline from the mid-1990s which was significantly reversed after 
2007.  In the UK, expenditure increased through to 2010, before falling back (Institute 
for Fiscal Studies 2013). No convergence is thus apparent in spending across time. 
 
 
 
Overall, all three countries demonstrated both a shared commitment to 
protect elder incomes now, in times of pressured budgets, alongside a policy aspiration 
to make older people (particularly in the future) take more responsibility for 
ensuring their own income in retirement (especially through state-sanctioned 
contributory private savings schemes). But significant differences in their 
approaches, generosity and spending remain.  Data plotting movements in the 
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incidence of poverty amongst the elderly are peculiarly difficult to interpret.2  
Instead, we simply conclude that, alongside sustained spending on healthcare (used 
disproportionately by the old and young), the evidence presented indicates that the 
living standards of the elderly in all three countries (and the OECD generally) have 
been protected by discharging the costs of demographic change and economic 
uncertainty on the younger, working-age population generation (OECD 2014a). 
 
Conclusion: Evidence and consequences 
 
In their earlier survey of the same three cases, Castles and Pierson (1996) argued 
that, despite facing many of the same social and economic pressures, there was 
limited evidence of convergence in the policy settings of Australia, New Zealand 
and the UK though to the mid-1990s.   Adopting Hay’s (2004) comprehensive 
framework, our findings are broadly similar: these three ‘liberal’ welfare states have 
faced similar social and economic pressures since the mid-1990s and, although the 
                                                 
2   Strange artefacts in the data make comparisons difficult: poverty levels in the UK 
improved in recent years, at least in part, because of a fall in the levels of median 
income (as a proportion of which elder poverty is calculated – Lupton et al, 2013). 
In both New Zealand and Australia, the figures fluctuated wildly, as the standard 
level of superannuation payments travelled back and forth across the line that 
marks 50% of median income. These numbers are an inadequate indicator of 
levels of wellbeing, notably in Australia where very high levels of home 
ownership among the retired constitute an under-reported aspect of their wealth, 
complicating poverty rankings which suggest Australia has a much higher rate of 
elder poverty than either New Zealand or the UK (Perry 2014; Whiteford p.c). 
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GFC had a far greater impact on the UK than either New Zealand or Australia, there 
were strong similarities in the cognitive filters used to interpret these pressures.  
Overall, we do not find evidence of growing sigma-convergence. In some cases, 
policy instruments or outcomes became more similar.  In others, pathways diverged. 
Of the three policy areas studied, the greatest convergence was apparent in 
welfare-to-work, where policy in the three countries did share a common trajectory.   
With few exceptions (New Zealand’s abolition of work-for-the-dole, the UK’s failure 
to adopt income management), all three countries have hardened eligibility and 
strengthened the obligations associated with unemployment benefits since the mid-
1990s, including for sole parents and those facing long-term sickness or disability. 
The widespread ‘simplification’ of benefit categories also moved many such 
claimants onto lower-paying (unemployment) benefits. No matter which political 
party was in power, attempts to get more people into paid work were presented as 
the key solution to poverty and reflected governmental reluctance to allocate 
expenditure towards the unemployed; notably, however, working-age poverty 
declined only in the UK (where benefit generosity increased significantly) and New 
Zealand (where Working for Families made a difference), while Australia reported the 
highest levels of poverty amongst workless households, despite its comparatively 
strong post-GFC economic position. 
To a degree, a common trajectory was also apparent in child-support policies 
in that all three countries now increasingly rely on tax credits to deliver assistance to 
families. However, the rhetorical focus on addressing child poverty and 'making 
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work pay' saw greater targeting in the UK and New Zealand and where this was 
strongest (in the UK), we saw both increased spending and the greatest 
improvement in child poverty, at least down to 2010. Evidence that child poverty is 
rising again indicates how quickly the UK’s divergent position may change 
(UNICEF 2014). 
Finally, all three countries commonly sought to reallocate responsibility for 
income maintenance towards the elderly population of the future while protecting 
present pensioner populations against retrenchment. But pension regimes still 
looked rather different and attitudes towards one of the principal weapons in the 
reform armoury – raising the pension age – varied across our three cases. There were 
also varied trends regarding generosity and spending. These differences likely 
reflect the differing institutional paths of each country (e.g. New Zealand’s universal 
pension) but it remains the case that most governments over the period studied 
explicitly favoured the electoral interests of the elderly over working-age people, 
especially young adults (Davidson 2012). As the OECD (2014a, 5) notes, ‘over the 
past 25 years youth replaced the elderly as the group experiencing the greater risk of 
income poverty. The recent crisis has accentuated this trend’. It is not possible to 
shift all of the costs of welfare state adjustment onto young workers (who 
increasingly pay for their own education, are less able to buy their own homes and 
have less secure and less well-paid jobs than their parents).   
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Our evidence also enables us to draw some relatively robust conclusions, both about 
the actual outcomes of social policy change in the past twenty years, but also about 
the ways in which we may choose to study it. 
 
First, any straightforward convergence story is clearly unsustainable.  What we see is 
not a simple process of convergence (or its absence), but rather ‘a complex and 
contingent pattern of convergence and divergence’ (Hay, 2004, 244-5). Often the 
direction of travel is the same, as is the language through which this trajectory is 
justified, but this is not enough to establish sigma-convergence.  While some 
indicators look much closer at the end of our period than they were at the start (for 
example, expenditure on unemployment benefits; see Fig 3), in other areas they have 
moved further apart or the rank-ordering of our states has reversed or both, (as in the 
incidence of child poverty down to 2010; see Fig 6 above).   Notably, this means we 
should reject one frequently articulated claim about welfare state policy under the 
duress of globalization, that is the idea that states are engaged in a “race to the 
bottom” in terms of standards of social policy provision; (for an effective account 
and critique,see Castles, 2004).    We have also to reject any straightforward claim 
about the retrenching impact of the GFC.    While a context of extended global 
recession has clearly had an impact upon welfare (and other public) budgets 
everywhere, the nature of the impact has varied according to local circumstances, 
across time and, significantly, in response to partisan identities.  To take just one 
indicator, total public expenditure as a percentage of GDP grew across all three 
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countries in the period between 1995 and 2013/14, from 18.4% to 20.8% in New 
Zealand, from 16.1% to 19% in Australia and from 19.2% to 21.7% in the UK 
(http://stats.oecd.org/).    
 
It is also important to stress that current retrenchment was preceded by 
significant investment (mostly but not entirely under Labour governments). In 
particular, the UK moved significantly up the OECD's 'league table' of social policy 
spenders (from an initially lowly position) between 1997 and 2010, in relation to 
health, education and family policy. It remained close to the foot of the table in 
relation to social security spending and overall income inequality increased during 
Labour's tenure in office (Lupton et al, 2013). Although Labour governments in New 
Zealand and Australia also spent more and spoke less of 'welfare dependency' than 
their conservative counterparts, the shift was less dramatic suggesting that policy 
not rhetoric matters most. The differential impact of similar economic pressures also 
played a role in justifying the Conservative-Liberal Democrat government’s 
wholesale cuts towards the very end of our period in the UK which evidence 
suggests will not only reverse the significant improvements seen in child poverty 
but also further weaken the position of working-aged citizens, particularly those 
aged under 25. 
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Our fine-grained analysis also suggests that the prevailing typologies – in this case, 
the idea of ‘liberal welfare states’ - are of limited value.     Of course, this is a 
criticism that goes back a long way with Castles and Mitchell (1992) insisting that 
this classification missed things that were distinctive about the antipodean 
experience.   But it is clear that a persistent emphasis upon redistribution and 
decommodification misses important components of the distributive mix.  And while 
we have pointed towards the commonalities across our three cases, there are 
important differences too.   Although New Zealand adopted Mixed Member 
Proportional Representation in 1996, somewhat unseating the logic that was said to 
allow a few highly-motivated men and women in Treasury to turn around national 
social policy at a moment’s notice, its unicameral system still affords far fewer veto 
points compared to the bicameralism of the UK and bicameralism plus federalism in 
Australia (Castles, 2005; Humpage, 2015). As we have seen, in very recent times both 
Senate in Australia and the House of Lords in the U.K. have effectively blocked 
important changes initiated by majoritarian governments in the lower house.   The 
timing of reform has also been important.  Neoliberal reforms were initiated under 
Labour governments in the two Antipodean countries but under the Conservative 
Party in the UK and this has influenced the character of subsequent reforms.  In 
assessing the impacts of globalisation, New Zealand’s relatively small population 
and geographic isolation, Australia’s resource richness and the UK’s membership of 
the European Union all make local circumstances distinctive, as, for example, when 
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the GFC struck. 
 
A further lesson of our case studies is that partisan effects persist, even if it appears 
as if all the reforming traffic is one direction.   In part, this is because the process of 
aggregation of data can conceal local differences or counter-trends.    Perhaps the 
clearest indication of a partisan effect in our survey is the experience of child 
endowment under New Labour in the UK.  Although the Blair governments often 
appear as exemplary cases of the neo-liberal turn in previously social democratic 
parties, in fact, the record of Labour spending on child-related benefits and services 
through the first decade of the twenty-first century show a remarkable expansion.  
This was enough to invert standings on child poverty across our three cases between 
1996 and 2012.   As if to reinforce this point, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat and 
Conservative governments that have been in power since 2010 have set about 
systematically undermining this achievement, with CPAG (2014) estimating that 
reforms since 2010 will have forced an additional one million children into poverty 
by 2020.   We can see partisan effects in our other cases too – though these have not 
always been quite what one would expect; as, for example, in Australia’s National 
government legislating child-related benefits that reached a considerable distance up 
the income profile.   
 
Overall, we can see that convergence (and divergence) are multi-dimensional and 
multi-speed processes.  Hay’s (2004) typology gets us some way towards grasping 
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this complexity  but there is, as ever, the problem that our key indicators are not 
capturing the full (distributional and redistributional) picture.  This has long been 
recognised in welfare state studies (Castles 1985) but its salience is increased by 
coming developments (and especially growing inequality) in areas which had been 
seen (in the late twentieth century) to be of diminishing importance: for example, 
housing supply and the inheritance of unearned wealth.    Under these 
circumstances, the following three policy-related points are worth making.  Child 
poverty cannot be addressed solely through providing work-related benefits for 
parents and these indirect mechanisms of poverty relief may be reaching their limits 
(as in the U.K.).  Similarly, we may also be reaching the limits of the effective work 
that can be done by constantly emphasising labour-market participation.  Only so 
much traffic can pass from ‘welfare to work’.  Finally, while welfare states have 
always been above everything else, systems of support for the older population, all 
three states require some re-balancing by age cohort, as it is not possible to sustain a 
social policy regime over the long term by ring-fencing social protection for the 
elderly while defraying all of the costs upon a much younger generation.   
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